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1. SUMMARY: Petr in No. 78-309, an accounting firm, seeks review 
of CA 2's unprecedented holding that an implied private right of ac-.: = ===;::;;;:: 
tion exists under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
-Should a private right of action be found to exist, petr also seeks 
review of CA 2's holding that resp Re~ington : (the liquidating trustee 
of a defunct brokerage firm) and resp SIPC (a quasi-governmental organi-
zation of broker-dealers) can assert this right, in their capacities 
as "bailee" and "subrogee" respectively, on behalf of the brokerage 
firm's customers. In Nos. 78-493 and 78-526, resps respectively 
cross-petition for cert on issues not reached by CA 2 below. These 
petns are discussed in separate memoranda attached hereto. 
2. FACTS: Weis Securities, Inc., was a brokerage firm and member 
J I 7{1.1 of the NYSE. 
15 USC § 78q(a), to file certain financial reports with the SEC. 
As such, Weis was required by § 17(a) of the '34 Act, 
Petr 
~~ pc. 
Touche Ross & Co., an independent CPA, audited and certified these 
r~orts. According to allegations of the complaint, Weis' officers . 
fraudulently misstated the firm's financial condition for fiscal 1972; 
they represented, inter alia, that the firm had a profit of $1.7 millio: 
whereas it actually suffered a $1.5 million loss. Petr allegedly per-
formed its 1972 audit of Weis' financial statements in a "reckless and 
grossly negligent manner," failing to discover Weis' misstatements 
and thus improperly certifying its reports. 
Resp SIPC is a non-profit organization of securities dealers creat 
~· ~~ 
~ by Congress in 1970. SIPC maintains a fund, bolstered by membership 
assessments, which it uses to compensate investors who sustain losses 
owing to broker insolvencies. When Weis' financial troubles came to 
- light in M~y 1973, SIPC, pursuant to st~tutory authority, moved in 
SDNY for a decr~e adjudging Weis' customers in need of protection 
~~)!:: the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA). The DC ordered 






cash and securities on hand, unfortunately, were insufficient to make 
its customers whole, and SIPC accordingly advanced $14 million to 
-------~~------~----------~----------the trustee to satisfy (up to specified statutory limits) th~ir claims. 
Des~e~s ~va~e, however, $51 million of customer claims remained 
unpaid. 
___.---::: . 
~ 1976 resps sued petr in SDNY, alleging that petr breached its 
duties under § 17(a) by recklessly certifying W~s' reports. SIPC 
sought to recover $14 million, either in its own right or as subrogee 
of the customers whose claims it had paid. The trustee sought to 
recover $51 million, theorizing that petr's conduct prevented him from 
safeguarding and preserving property that he as bailee held or should 
have held in trust for Weis' customers. Resps' theory, in brief, was 
that petr's reckless certification prevented Weis' troubles from sur-
facing until it was too late to take remedial action, thus contributing 
indirectly to customer losses. 
The DC (Wyatt, J) dismissed the suit under FRCivP 12(b) for failur E ... -
~to state a claim, holding that § 17(a) created no implied private right 
The DC noted that no court had ever decided whether a pri-_Jl f act ion. 
--- -<: -
c 
vate cause of action existed under§ 17(a), and that this Court in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 194 n.l3 (1976), had refused 
to consider this question. Analyzing the statutory language, however, 
the DC came up with a negative answer. Section 17(a) was basically a 
bookkeeping provision, requiring brokers to maintain records and to 
make "such reports as the [SEC] by its rules and regulations may pre-
scribe"; by its terms, therefore, § 17(a) did not "create any private 
rights in anybody." Section 18(a), by contrast, did create a private 
right of action for "misleading statements ... in any application, report 
or document filed" pursuant to the 1934 Act in favor of any person who 
"purchased or sold a security at a price" affected by the statements. 
Weis' customers had bought or sold stock in reliance on the reports petr 
had certified. Given this, the DC refused to find an implied right of 
action under § 17 broader than the express right of action that Congress 
had created in the very next section of the Act. The juxtaposition of 
these two sections, the DC concluded, "strongly suggest[ed] a legislative 
intent that the only private claim for a violation of § 17 was the claim 
created in § 18." 
...,.,.-
3. DECISION BELOW: A divided panel of CA 2 reversed, holding that 
§ 17(a) created an implied private right of action on behalf of a bro-
ker's customers and that resps could assert this right. As a prelimi-
nary matter, Judge Lumbard rejected the DC's description of § 17(a) as 
a "bookkeeping" provision that imposed no duty on accountants. He 
noted that § lO(b) an9 _Rule 10-b(S) ~mpose a duty on accountants for 
breach of which they can be sued, and said that the ··result should be 
no different under § 17. Whether an accountant's breach of its § 17 
duties gave rise to an implied right of action, however, depended on 
the application of this Court's test in Cort v. Ash, 422 US 66 (1975). 
In that case, the Court set forth four factors to be used in de-
termining whether "a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressl 
providing one": (1) whether plaintiff is "one of the class for whose 
especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any in-
dication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create such 
a remedy or deny one; (3) whether implication of a private right is 
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; 
and (4) whether the righ~ought to be asserted is one traditionally 
relegated to state law. CA 2 held that all four requisites were met here. 
First, CA 2 held that § 17(a) was enacted for the special protec-
tion of customers of brokerage houses. Section 17 empowers the SEC to 
require reports that are "necessary ••• for the protection of investor~"; 
SEC rules mandate that these repor~s be audited, and if the CPA finds 
"material inadequacies" in them it must notify the broker·s customers. 
Section 17' s reporting system, CA 2 said, enables the SEC to _enforce 
the brokers' "net capital rule," a rule , designed to protect customers 
against loss in the event of the broker's liquidation. 
Second, Judge Lumbard found "no indication, either in the statute 
itself or. in its legislative his tory, of any congressional intent either 
to create a private remedy under § 17 or to deny one." The legislative 
history, the court said, was · "inute," leading to the conclusion that 
Congress had not explicitly considered the question. Nor could it be 
said that Congress implicitly chose to deny a private right of action 
by committing enforcement to the SEC alone: such an intent, as CA 2 
had recently said, "will nQt readily be implied." Abrahamson v. Flesch-
~, 568 .F2d 862, 874 n.l9 (1977), cert denied, 98 SCt 2253 (1978) (find-
ing an implied right of action under the Investment Advisers Act). 
Third, the majority held that implication of a private right of 
action was consistent with the statutory scheme. Section 17 imposed . 
on accountants a duty to certify report~ ac;curately. Yet the SEC "does 
not have the resources to examine and audit all documents that it re-
ceives," and "neither SEC injunctive actions nor criminal prosecutions 
will restore to customers the money they have lost." Accordingly, a 
private remedy was an essential supplement to § 17's enforcement scheme. 
Fourth, CA 2 held that remedies for accountants' negligence and 
malpractice were not "traditionally reiegated to state law." Problems 
caused by broker insolvencies were national in scope, and state-law 
protection of customers varied; federal courts alone could give relief. 
I 
Judge Lumbard then rejected the DC's argument that Congress had 
~esigned § 18(a) as the exclusive remedy for violation of § 17. Since 
a misstatement in a § 17 report would not normally affect the prices 
of customers' stock held by the insolvent broker, "a strict application 
of § 18's limiting language would leave customers without any remedy 
whatsoever, no matter how egregious the fraud or how grievous the loss." 
( Because it was "plain that brokers' customers are the favored wards 
of § 17," CA 2 could not agree that "Congress simultaneously sought 
to protect a class and deprived the class of the means of protection." 
CA 2 conceded that § 18's "purchaser or seller" rule, as well as Blue 
Chip, would limit suit by investors ~ investors; yet CA 2 did not 
think this limiting rule "applie[d] to brokers' C'-;1Stomers, protection 
of whom is wholly independent of protection of investors per se." 
Having concluded that § 17 creates a private right of action for 
customers, CA 2 considered whether resps could assert that right on 
the customers' behalf. The court admitted that 15 USC§ 78fff(f)(l) 
/ explicitly gave SIPC a right of subrogation only to customers' claims 
( against the defunct broker's estate. Yet the court held that SIPC 
could also assert a right of subrogation to customers' claims against 
third parties (such as petr), finding "no reason to believe that [§ 78-
fff(f)(l)] was meant to destroy SIPC's general common-law right of 
equitable subrogation," citing state insurance cases. As to the trustee 
CA 2 held that he could not sue on behalf of Weis, since Weis was the 
regulated entity, not the entity Congress meant to protect (citing 
Chris-Craft). But CA 2 thought he could sue as bailee: he was "respon-
sible for marshalling and returning [the customers'] property," and 
to the extent that he was unable to do so he could sue the wrongdoer 
on behalf of his bailors. CA 2 cited FRCivP 17(a) in support of this 
conclusion ("[A] ... bailee ... may sue in his own name without joining 
with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought.") Having 
concluded that resps could sue, CA 2 remanded to the DC for further oro-
ceedings, including a determination of "the appropriate· standard ... for 
accountant liability in an action under § 17." 
Judge Timbers concurred "without qualification" in Judge Lumbard's 
opinion. He wrote briefly to answer some of the disse~t's arguments, 
and to express his belief that this Court's recent cases had not "re-
stricte~' the teaching of J.I. Case Co. ·v. Borak. 
Judge Mulligan dissented. He began by questioning whether the 
, '-..... ---
Cort criteria were even-.relevant here. Those criteria were announced 
for use in deciding whether to imply a private remedy "in a statute 
not expressly providing one." In this case, however, Congress h£Q ex-
pressly provided a private remedy for violation of § 17: § 18(a) followed 
on the heels of that section and gave limited relief for misleading 
statements in reports filed under it. Assuming arguendo the applicabilit 
of the Cort criteria, moreover, Judge Mulligan found the majority's 
analysis weak. First~ he doubted that brokers' customers were the 
"especial concern" of Congress when it enacted § 17(a); if they had been, 
Congress would have given them a private remedy in§ 18(a), which was 
enacted contemporaneously. Second, under the maxim "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius" the existence of a limited express right under §18 
was clear evidence of a congressional intent to deny a broader implied 
right under § 17. In Nat'l RR Passenger Corp v. Nat'l Assn of Passen-
gers (Amtrak), 414 US 453 (1974), this Court applied that maxim to 
find no implied cause of action where a statute expressly provided for 
enforcement by the Justice Dept: "Since the Act creates .•. a private 
cause of action only under very limited circumstances, thi8 maxim would 
clearly compel the conclusion that the remedies created are the ex-
clusive means to enforce" the act. Similarly, in SIPC v. Barbour, 421 
US 412, 419 (1975), this Court held that express statutory provision 
for SEC injunctive relief precluded an implied private remedy: "Express 
statutory provision for one form of protection ordinarily implies that 
no other means of enforcement was intended by the Legislature." In 
l Blue Chip, finally, this Court had addressed§ 18 specifi~ally; notingtha § 18(a) "limits the express remedy provided for its violation to 'any 
( 
person ... who •.• shall have purcnasea or soLa a ~ecu~L cy, LUt: vVU.L 1.. 
said "it would be anomalous indeed to impute to Congress an intention 
to expand the plaintiff class for a judi,cially implied cause of action 
beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express causes of action." 
421 US at 736. Since § 18(a) encompassed only purchasers or sellers, 
Judge Mulligan concluded that it left broker customers who were not 
purchasers or sellers unprotected; in holding otherwise, the majority 
engaged in "judicial legislation." Judge Mulligan noted that every 
court to consider whether a private remedy should be implied under 
other reporting sections of the 1934 Act (~, § 13(a)) had held that 
§ 18(a) provided the sole route to relief. 
Turning to the third Cort factor, the dissent argued that private 
enforcement was not necessary to effect Congress's goals in§ 17, at 
least not within the meaning of Chris-Craft. Section 17's reporting 
requirements, the SEC's capital-adequacy rule, and Congress's creation 
of SIPC alike demonstrate that the primary protection for brokers' cus-
tomers lies in preventive monitoring by ~h~ SEC, SIPC, and the self-
regulatory organizations. Congress's intent was prophylactic; it did 
not mean to allow private lawsuits for damages ~fter broker insolvencies 
had occurred. In response to the majority's assertion that the SEC 
lacked resources to do its monitoring job, Judge Mulligan quoted Chris-
Craft: "Institutional limitations alone do not lead to the conclusion 
that any party· ••. should have a cause of action for damages." 430 US at 4 
Turning to the final Cort factor, the dissent argued that state 
tort law provided adequate remedies for accountant malpractice. All 
States provided a remedy for fraudulent misrepresentations; recently, 
many States showed a trend toward expanding accountants' liability for 
negligence. After Ernst & Ernst, therefore, state courts might well 
provide the more effective forum. 
For these reasons, the dissent found no implied right of action 
(, 
under § 17 in favor of broker customers. Even if such a right existed, 
however, Judge Mulligan thought that resps were not the prope~ parties -· ~--- ---to assert it. The majority agreed in d~ctum that SIPC could not sue 
~
in its own behalf under §17. The majority admitted that SIPC by statute 
was subrogated only to customers' claims against the broker. Given y 
this, the -dissent could not see "by what alchemy a congressionally-
created corporation w~_th limited powers to litigate" could sue in federal 
court. By endowing SIPC with subrogation rights against third parties 
the majority not only violated the "expressio unius" rule; it also 
ignored Congress's clear directive that SIPC was subrogated "with the 
rights and priorities provided in this section." -15 USC§ 78fff(f)(l). 
The trustee, in ~he dissent's view, fared no better. The majority 
agreed that the trustee could not sue on behalf_ of W~is. Yet the t~Js-
tee's duty to "marshal and return customers' property" was inherent in 
his capacity as Weis' trustee. By "denominating him a bailee" the 
majority did not add "a jot or a tittle to his statutorily created 
status as the representative of Weis--an entity regulated by, and pre-
cluded from suing under, the Act." 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr's argumen~s track those of the dissent 
below: § 18(a) provides an express remedy for misleading statements 
in '34 Act reports; neither resps nor Weis' customers can sue under 
§ 18, since they did not buy or sell securities in reliance on those 
misleading statements; if they cannot sue under § 18, they should not 
be afforded a broader judicial remedy under § 17. This Court noted in 
Amtrak that the "expressio unius" doctrine must "yield to clear con-
trary evidence of legislative intent." 414 US at 458. Yet CA 2 con-
ceded that there is no contrary evidence from the legislative history 
in this -case-, and so the doctrine applies here with its full force. 
Petr contends that CA 2's decision conflicts, not only with this 
courL · s recen~ ca5e~, ouL aL~v -··- ··-·--- ----- -~---
refusing to find implied rights of action under other reporting pro-
visions of the '34 Act. In In re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 
I 
494 F2d 528 (1974), CA 3 refused to "imply a right of action in§ 13(a) 
to avoid the purchaser-seller requirement of § 18." Id. at 540-41. 
The same reasoning, says petr, applies in the case of§ 17(a). 
As to SIPC's standing petr adopts the dissent's arguments. As to 
the trustee's standing petr adds a new one. Under 15 USC§ 78fff(b)(l), 
the trustee has the same powers and title to property as a Chapter X 
trustee. In Caplin v. Marine Midland Trust, 406 US 416 (1972), this 
Court held that a Chapter X trustee had no standing to assert creditors' 
claims against third parties. Caplin's reasoning, petr says, indicates 
-
that the trustee lacks standing here. 
Finally, petr stresses the importance of CA 2's holding. Between 
1970-77 there were 128 brokerage insolvencies, involvin£ 104,000 customer ..... ~ 
claims; the potential for expansion of liability under CA 2's theory is -thus extraordinary. CA 2's holding, moreover, is not limited to the 
insolvency context: § 17(a) claims can now be asserted by customers 
against any reports filed by the 5000 broker-dealers registered with 
the SEC. CA2's reasoning, finally, is not limited to§ 17(a), but is 
authority for implying rights of action under all the other reporting 
sections of the '34 Act in favor of persons who are not purchasers or 
sellers of securities. In this event, § 18(a) and Blue Chip will be 
eviscerated. 
Amicus American Inst ofCPAs joins petr in urging the Court to grant 
cert. Amicus stresses that § 17(a), unlike every other section of the 
---------~- -
'34 Act under which a private remedy has been implied, does not pro--scribe a~ wron~ful conduct at all. It is a bookkeeping and reporting 
:w=.w:= ._. ..._.... ....... 
provision, not an antifraud provision, and it lacks the antifraud pro-
visions' broad remedial purpose. Amicus examines the legislative his-
""· 
tory of the '34 Act and concludes that Congress plainly intended that 
§ 18(a)--with its purchaser/seller limitation--was designed as the ex-
' 
elusive remedy for misleading statements in reports. Finally, amicus 
emphasizes the breadth of CA 2's holding and its potential impact on 
accountants. Basically, CA 2 held that "anyone who might derive some 
benefit from a report filed with the SEC may sue under the '34 Act 
for whatever damages he may incur regardless of the absence of any 
connection with a securities transaction." CA 2 imposed this broad 
liability, moreover, not on the issuer of the reports, but on the audi-
tor, who is one step removed. Since the contours of accountants' lia-
bility are, by CA 2's admission, unclear (CA 2 rem.anded on this ques-
tion), that court's holding imposes "a liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Ultramares 
Co~~· v. Touche, 255 NY 170, 179 (1931) (Cardozo, J). 
Resp SIPC generally relies on the majority opinion. Resp 
says that review by this Court would be premature, since CA 2's deci-
sion was rendered on a motion to dismiss and there is thus no evidentiar: 
record. Resp, however, does not deny that this Court has taken many 
securities cases on motions to dismiss, ~' Santa Fe Industries v. 
Green, 430 US 462 (1977). Resp urges that there is no conflict with 
CA 3. TheCA 3 case involved§ 13(a). That section requires "issuers 
of securities" to file reports "as necessary or appropriate for the 
proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the secur-
!!Y·" Since § 13(a) focuses on issuers of corporate securities, § 18(a) 
which concerns purchasers or sellers of corporate securities, is obvious -
ly the exclusive remedy for violation of that section. Sections 13(a) 
and 18(a), in -other words, go hand-in-hand, for each is concerned with 
investors qua investors. Section 17(a), by contrast, is concerned with 
customers of broker-dealers, who may not be purchasers or sellers. 
I 
\ 
There is no reason to find that § 18(a) is the exclusive remedy for 
them. Resp distinguishes Blue Chip on the same ground. As to· the 
question of its "standing," finally, resp says cert is unwarranted be-
cause Congress has mooted this issue for the future. In May 1978, 
Congress amended SIPA to state that "in addition t~ all other rights 
it may have at law or in equity, SIPC shall be subrogated to the claims 
of ••• customers " Pub L No 95-283, § 9. 
Resp Redington mainly addresses the question of his standing. 
Centuries-old bailment lore indicates that a bailee can sue a tort-
feasor for damage to bailed goods. This Court's Caplin case is dis-
tinguishable: that case~did not involve bailments. 
5. DISCUSSION: The decision below seems questionable in all re-
spects. Congress's grant of an express remedy in § 18(a) is compelling -evidence that it did not intend to accord a broader implied remedy in 
§ 17. Absent countervailing evidence, the statutory structure would 
appear dispositive; yet CA 2 admitted that there is . no countervailing 
evidence at all. Resps seems right in saying that, techincally speak-
ing, there is no circuit conflict, since CA 3 was talking about § 13(a). 
Yet there is a clear conflict in principle, and I find resps' effort 
to distinguish § 13 from § 17 on "investor"/"customer" grounds uncon-
vincing: both sections involve "reports," and § 18 provides the sole 
express remedy for misleading statemen~s in "reports." I agree with 
petr and amicus that CA 2's opinion has great potential for expansion 
to other reporting sections of the '34 Act, a result which would evi-
dently undermine Blue Chip and cause § 17(a) to supplant Rule 10-b(5) 
as the preferred route to recovery--finessing 10-b(5)'s purchaser/seller 
rule. In view of this, I would grant despite the technical · absence of 
a conflict. 
The SEC apparently filed an amicus brief in CA 2, arguing that a 
private right of action should be implied under§ 17(a). See Petn at 
On Nov 6, 1978, this Court granted cert in TAMA v. ' Lewis, No. 
( 77-1645, to consider whether a private right of action should be im-
plied under the Investment Advisers ~ct. If the Court does not grant 
cert in this case, it may be advisable to hold this one for that one. 
The statutes involved, of course, are completely different, but that 
case may provide an occasion for further elucidation of the Cort v. 
Ash factors applied to securities cases. 
Grant. 
There are two responses, an amicus brief, and a reply. 
11/7/78 Lauber Cps in petn 
s~c.L f1-.L ~ ~ ~ ~ ..-.ev-~#<o TAM4 ~-L~:r , 
~ 1 rl- s ~ _u~ ~ /,( ~ CA-d<- ;:,,. {1-J t?l--e__, c #- s-4 
~ lo~ j,,.. ~~~i».. Jkr_..s~ 
~ ~· ~ ~ ~ _,k ~f'-r~ rJ,s ~~ ~ 
,-....f""id "''f'-" -1 ~ ..--s-1<1 ..;,. c~.,r "· If~~ 
'
8 usc f JP~'J. J ~ c.v-~~ ~ fl-J- ~,.·h,~ LS 
~3th""-<- .J,. rJ.v ~'"" Jo /,41'1-t "· L-.riJ ooov-< ~ "-'-<:: ~ 
( tt ;f l' f) ....-~c...{). 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , .J 9 .. . No.78-309 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
TOUCHE ROSS & CO. 
vs. 
REDINGTON 
Also motion of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants for 












ABSENT NOT VOTING 
G D 
Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . ..... '(" i/ ............ . 
Brennan, J ............................ . ... .............................................. . 
Ste~art, J .................... ·~· .v!. ........ ·w~t · 'Jj ·~ ·.; 1..·~ · ....................... . 
::~:~a~;,.~: .. ::::::: .. :::.:: .. ::: ........ ·.~ ..... Q ... .J . tr . . ~ .. . "' · ..... . T.~~ ........... ......... . 
.... •... ····· ~ · .................................. . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. • ~~ .. ~ . . . . . . . . . . .. ........................ . 
Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ~ . . . . . ........... . 
Rehnquist, J.. . .. . . .. .. . . .... . V. . . .. .. .. .. T ... )[A .. ~ ...... . 
Stevens, J ............... . V.. ......... ~ ..... A. H L .4 ....... . 
to: fbe Cbiet Justice 
Jlr. Justice Brennan 
Kr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Kr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
f\ 1 _ _ ~ _ ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ( ~ g ust ice Powell 
t::/Zt.A!.- y-a ~~-ustice Stevens 
~ ~ ~ From: Kr. Justice Rehnquist 
~ dl-j ~ : t t MAY 1979 
•. 
1st DRAFT ~~pted: 
'SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'fm 
No, 78-309 
Touche Ross & Co., Petitioner,) 0 . f C . . h n Wnt o ertwran to t a 
v,. United States Court of Ap.., 
Edward S. Redmgton, Etc,, peals for the Second Circuit, 
et al. 
[May -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Once again, we are called upon to decide whether a private 
-remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. 
During this Term alone, we have been asked to undertake 
this task no less than five times in cases in which we have 
granted certiorari.1 Here we decide whether customers of 
securities brokerage firms that are required to file certain fi-
nancial reports with regulatory authorities by § 17 (a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S. C.§ 78q 
(a), have an implied cause of action for damages under § 17 
(a) against accountants who audit such reports based on 
misstatements contained in the reports.2 
1 See, e. g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, - U. S. - (1979); Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, - U. S. - (1979); Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisers, Inc . v. Lewis, No. 77-1645, cert. granted, 439 U. S. 952 (1978); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, No. 78--309, cert. granted, 439 U. S. 979 
(1978); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, No. 78-711, cert, 
granted, 439 U. S.- (1979) . 
2 In 1972, the date relevant to the instant case, § 17 (a), 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78q (a), read as follows : 
" (a) Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every 
broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium 
of any such member, every registered securities association, and every 
broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 78o of tll.is title, shall make, 
keep, and preserve for such periods, such accounts, correspondence, memo• 
78-309-0PINION 
2 TOUCHE ROSS & CO. v. REDINGTON 
I 
Petitioner Touche Ross & Co. is a firm of certified public 
accountants. Weis Securities, Inc. (Weis), a securities bro-
kerage firm registered as a broker-dealer with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (Commission) and a member of 
the New York Stock Exchange (Exchange), retained Touche 
Ross to serve as Weis' independent certified public accountant 
from 1969 to 1973. In this capacity Touche Ross conducted 
audits of Weis' books and records and prepared for filing with 
the Commission the annual reports of financial condition · 
required by § 17 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78q (a), 
and the rules and regulations adopted thereunder. 17 CFR 
§ 240.17a-5.3 Touche Ross also prepared for Weis responses· 
randa, papers, books, and other records, and make such reports, as the 
Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of jnvestors. Such 
accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records 
shall be subject at any time or from time to time to such reasonable 
periodic, special, or other examinations by examiners or other representa-
tives of the Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 
Section 17 of the 1934 Act was substantially amended by the Securities 
Acts Amendments of 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 14, 89 Stat. 137 (1975) . 
The present § 17 (a) (1) contains essentially the same language as the first 
sentence of the 1972 version of § 17 (a). Compare 15 U. S. C. § 78q (a) 
(1970) with 15 U.S. C.§ 78q (a) (1) (1976). 
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelde1·, 425 U. S. 185, 194 n. 13 (1976), we 
reserved decision on the question whether the respondents in that case 
could assert a private cause of action against Ernst & Ernst under § 17 (a) . 
8 At the time Touche Ross performed auditing serv-ices for Weis, Com-
mission Rule 17a-5 required Weis to file an annual report of its financial 
condition, including a certificate by an independent public accountant 
stating "clearly the opinion of the accountant with respect to the finan-
cial statement covered by the certificate and the accounting principles 
and practices reflected therein." 17 CFR §§ 240.17a-5 (a), (h) . See also 
SEC Release No. 3338.(Nov. 28, 1942) , X-17A-5. The rule also requtred 
the accountant's certificate to contain a "reasonably comprehensive state-
ment as to the scope of the audit made, including a statement as to · 
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to financial questionnaires required by the Exchange of its 
member firms. 
This case arises out of the insolvency and liquidation of 
Weis. In 1973, the Commission and the Exchange learned 
of Weis' precarious financial condition and of possible viola-
tions of the 1934 Act by Weis audits officers. In May 1973, 
the Commission sought and was granted an injunction barring 
Weis and five of its officers from conducting business in vio-
lation of the 1934 Act.4 At the same time, the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), pursuant to stat-
utory authority, applied in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York for a decree adjudging 
that W eis' customers were in need of the protection afforded 
by the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 84 Stat. 
1636, 15 U. S. C. § 78aaa et seq." The District Court granted 
whether the accountant reviewed the procedures followed for safeguarding 
the securities of customers, ... whether the audit was made in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards applicable in the circumstances 
[and] whether the audit made omitted any procedure deemed necessary 
by the accountant under the circumstances of the particular case." 17 
CFR § 240.17a-5 (g) (2) . Nothing in the rule was to be interpreted to imply 
authority to omit any procedure the accountant ordinarily would employ 
in the course of an audit made for the purpose of expressing the opinions 
required by the rule. !d., § 240.17a-5 (g) (3) . Weis was required to 
attach an oath or affirmation to the report that the financial statements 
were true and correct. !d., § 240.17a-5 (b) (2). The Commission has 
amended rule 17a-5 since 1972. See 17 CFR § 240--17a-5 (1978) . 
4 Some months later several of Weis' officers were indicted, in part, for 
a conspiracy to violate and a number of substantive violations of the 
recordkeeping and reporting regulations adopted by the Commission under 
§ 17 (a). United States v. A1·thur Levine, et al., 73 Crim. 693, SDNY; see 
United States v. Solomon, 509 F . 2d 863, 865 (CA2 1975). Four of the 
defendants pleaded guilty to at least one substantive count ; the other 
was found guilty of one sub tantive count. Ibid. 
5 SIPC is a nonprofit organization of securities dealers established by 
Congress in 1970 in the Securities Investor Protection Act. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78ccc. SIPC maintains a fund, supported by assessments of its mem-
bers, which is used to compensate, up to specified limits, customers of 
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the requested decree and appointed respondent Redington 
(Trustee) to act as trustee in the liquidation of the Weis 
business under SIP A. 
During the liquidation, Weis' cash and securities on hand 
appeared to be insufficient to make whole those customers who 
had left assets or deposits with Weis. Accordingly, pursuant 
to SIPA, SIPC advanced the Trustee $14 million to satisfy, 
up to specified statutory limits, the claims of the approxi-
mately 34,000 Weis customers and certain other creditors of 
Weis. Despite the advance of $14 million by SIPC, there 
apparently remain several million dollars of unsatisfied cus-
tomer claims.6 
In 1976, SIPC and the Trustee filed this action for damages 
against Touche Ross in the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. The "common allegations" of the com-
plaint, which a.t this stage of the case we must accept as true, 
aver that certain of Weis' officers conspired to conceal sub-
stantial opera.ting losses during its 1972 fiscal year by falsi-
fying financial reports required to be filed with regulatory 
brokerage firms who incur losses as a result of broker insolvencies. !d., 
§§ 78ddd, 78fff (f). If SIPC determines that a member has failed or is 
in danger of failing to meet its obligations to customers and finds any 
one of five specified conditions indicating po::;sible financial instability, 
it may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for a decree adjudicating 
that the customers of such member are in need of the protection afforded 
by the Act. !d., § 78eee (a) (2). SIPA also provides procedures for the 
liquidation of brokerage firms when required. !d., § 78fff. See generally 
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 415-418 
(1975) . 
6 At the time Weis was liquidated, property on hand permitted the 
Trustee to return to the Weis customers 67% of the property they should 
have received. Redington v. Touche Ross, Nos. 77-7183, 77-7186, CA2, 
Apr. 21, 1978, App. 194 n. 6. Subsequent marshaling of assets and re-
coveries in other litigation apparently have reduced the amount of the 
deficit in the fund of customer property. Brief for Trustee 10 n. 5. The 
W eis customer accounts were protected by SIP A up to a maximum of 
$50,000 for eaeh customer, except that cash claims were limited to $20,000, 
15 U. S. C. § 78fff (f) (1970). ' ' 
·. 
78-309-0PINION 
TOUCHE ROSS & CO. v. REDINGTON 5 
authorities pursuant to § 17 (a) of the 1934 Act. App. 8. 
SIPC and the Trustee seek to impose liability upon Touche 
Ross by reason of its allegedly improper audit and certifica-
tion of the 1972 Weis financial statements and preparation 
of answers to the Exchange financial questionnaire. !d., at 
15-19. The complaint alleges that because of its improper 
conduct, Touche Ross breached duties that it owed SIPC, 
the Trustee and others under the common law, § 17 (a) and 
the regulations thereunder and that Touche Ross' alleged 
dereliction prevented Weis' true financial condition from 
becoming known until it was too late to take remedial action 
to forestall liquidation or to lessen the adverse financial con-
sequences of such a liquidation to the Weis customers. !d., 
at 8-9. The trustee seeks to recover $51 million on behalf 
of Weis in its own right and on behalf of the customers of 
W eis whose property the Trustee was unable to return. 
SIPC claims $14 million, either as subrogee of Weis' customers 
whose claims it has paid under SIP A or in its own right. 
The federal claims are based on § 17 (a) of the 1934 Act; the 
complaint also alleges several state common-law causes of 
action based on accountants negligence, breach of contract 
and breach of warranty.7 
The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that no 
claim for relief was stated because no priva.te cause of action 
could be implied from § 17 (a). 428 F. Supp. 483 (1977).8 
7 Approximately one year prior to institution of this action in federal 
court, SIPC and the Trustee commenced a nearly identical suit against 
Touche Ross in New York state court. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 
Index No. 13996/76, S. Ct., N.Y. County. The parties, factual allegations, 
claims and requests for damages are the same in the state court action 
as they are in the federal suit, except that there is no claim in the state 
court action under § 17 (a). Touche Ross has begun discovery in the 
state court action, but otherwise it has remained virtually inactive since 
the filing of the complaint. Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., Nos. 77-
7183, 77-7186, App. 195 n. 7. 
8 In the District Court's view, § 17 (a) was essentially a bookkeeping-
prm·ision. By its terms, it did not impose any duty on accountants and 
-
78-309-0PINION 
6 TOUCHE ROSS & CO. v. REDINGTON 
A divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed. Nos. 77-
7183, 77-7186, Apr. 21, 1978 (hereinafter all citations to the 
unpublished opinion will be to the Appendix herein). The 
court first found that § 17 (a) imposes a duty on accountants. 
App. 196. It next concluded, based on the factors set forth 
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78 (1'975), that an accountant's 
breach of his § 17 (a) duty gives rise to an implied private 
right of action for damages in favor of a broker-dealer's 
customers, even though it acknowledged that the "legislativ~ 
history of the section is mute on the issue." !d., 198. The 
court held that SIPC and the Trustee could assert this 
implied cause of action on behalf of the Weis customers.9 
did not "create any rights in anybody." 428 F. Supp. 483, 489, 491 
(1977). By contrast, the court notPd that § 18 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 78r (a), did create an express private right of action for damages 
arising from materially misleading statements in any report filed pursuant 
to the 1934 Act in favor of any person who, in reliance on the statements, 
purchased or sold a security whose price was affected by the statements. 
See n. 12, infra. SIPC and the Trustee could not sue under § 18 (a) 
because neither ihey nor Weii:i' customers had bought or sold stock in 
reliance on the reports Touclw Ross had prepared and certified. In view 
of § 18 (a), the court declined to infer a private right of action under 
§ 17 (a) broader than the express rpmedy Congress had created in the very 
next section of the Act. ThP court concluded that the subject matter, 
titles and juxtaposition of the two sections "strongly suggest a legislative 
intent that the only private claim for a violation of Section 17 was the 
claim created in Section 18." 428 F. Supp., at 489. 
The District Court also held that since the § 17 (a) claim should be 
dismissed, there was no basis for exPrcising pendent jurisdiction over the 
common-law claims, and that there was no other basis for exercising sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the common-law claims. !d., at 492-493. 
None of these latter rulings are bPfore us. 
9 The court rejected the District Court's conclusion that § 18 {a) was in-
tendPd to be the exclusive remedy for violation of§ 17 (a) . Because, in the 
court's view, it was plain that brokPrs' customers were the "favored wards" 
of§ 17 (a), it could not agree that "Congress simultanpously sought to pro-
tect a class and deprived the class [by virtue of § 18's limiting language] of 
the means of protection." App. 200. The court declined to permit the 
Trustee and SIPC to maintain the § 17 (a) action in their own right, 
although it held that the Trustee could assert the§ 17 (a) action on behalf 
-. 
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We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 979 (1978), and we now 
reverse. 
II 
The question of the existence of a statutory cause of action 
is, of course, one of statutory construction. Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, - U. S. -,- (1979); see National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad 
Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458 (1974) (hereinafter Amtrak). 
SIPC's argument in favor of implication of a private right of 
action based on tort principles, therefore, is entirely mis-
placed. Brief for SIPC 22-23. As we recently have em-
phasized, "the fact that a federal statute has been violated and 
some person harmed does not automatically give rise to a pri-
vate cause of action in favor of that person." Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, supra, at -. Instead, our task is 
limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to 
create the private right of action asserted by SIPC and the 
Trustee. And as with any case involving the interpretation 
of a statute, our analysis must begin with the language of the 
statute itself. Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 
-; Teamsters v. Daniel,-U.S.-,- (1979); Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472 (1977); Piper v. 
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977); Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). 
At the time pertinent to the case before us, § 17 (a) read, 
in relevant part as follows: 
"Every national securities exchange, every member there-
of the Weis customers as "bailee" of the customer property that he was 
unable to return and that SIPC could sue on behalf of the customers as 
"subrogee" of the customers whose claims it had paid. App. 201-204. 
The court remanded the case to the District Court for consideration of 
whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state actions in light of 
the Court of Appeals' ruling on § 17 (a). !d., 192 n. 3, 204. Since we· 
hold that the Court of Appeals wrongly implied a private federal claim 
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of .•. and every broker or dealer registered pursuant 
to ... this title, shaH make, keep and preserve for such 
periods, such accounts, correspondence . . . and other 
records, and make such reports, as the Commission by its 
rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors." 15 U.S. C.§ 78q (a) (1970). 
In terms, § 17 (a) simply requires broker-dealers and others 
to keep such records and file such reports as the Commission 
may prescribe. It does not. by its terms, purport to create 
a private cause of action in favor of anyone. It is true that 
in the past our cases have held that in certain circumstances 
a private right of action may be implied in a statute not 
expressly providing one. But in those cases finding such 
implied private remedies, the statute in question at least 
prohibited certain conduct or created federal rights in favor 
of private parties. E. g. , Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
supra (20 U. S. C. § 1681); Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454 (1975) ( 42 U. S. C. § 1981); 
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6 
(1971) (15 U. S. C. § 78j (b)); Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 (1969) ( 42 U. S. C. § 1982); Allen 
v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) ( 42 U.S. C. 
§ 1973c); Jon es v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) 
( 41 U. S. C. § 1982); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 
(1964) (15 U.S. C.§ 78n (a)). By contrast, § 17 (a) neither 
confers rights on private parties nor proscribes any conduct as 
unlawful. 
The intent of § 17 (a) is evident from its face. Section 
17 (a) is like provisions in countless other statutes that simply 
require certain regulated businesses to keep records and file 
periodic reports to enable the relevant governmental authori-
ties to perform their regulatory functions. The reports and 
records provide the regulatory authorities with the necessary 
information to oversee compliance with and enforce the vari~ 
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ous statutes and regulations with which they are concerned. 
In this case, the § 17 (a) reports, along with inspections and 
other information, enable the Commission and the Exchange 
to ensure compliance with the "net capital rule," the prin-
cipal regulatory tool by which the Commission and the Ex-
change monitor the financial health of brokerage firms and 
protect customers from the risks involved in leaving their 
cash and securities with broker-dealers.10 The information 
contained in the § 17 (a) reports is intended to provide the 
Commission, the Exchange and other authorities with a suffi-
ciently early warning to enable them to take appropriate 
action to protect investors before the financial collapse of the 
particular broker-dealer involved. But § 17 (a) does not 
by any stretch of its language purport to confer private 
damage rights or, indeed, any remedy in the event the regu-
latory authorities are unsuccessful in achieving their objec-
tives and the broker becomes insolvent before corrective 
10 See, e. g., Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Brokers and 
Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, H. R. Doc. No. 92-231, 02d Cong., 2d Sess., 7-8, 15, 22, 24 
(1971); Exchange Act Release No. 11497 (June 26, 1975); National 
Assn. of Securities Dealers, 12 S. E. C. 322, 329 n. 9 (1942) . The net 
capital mle requires a broker to main~in a certain minimum ratio of net 
capital to aggregate indebtednrss so that the broker's assets will always 
be sufficiently liquid to enable him to mert all of his current obligations. 
See 15 U.S. C.§ 78o (c) (3) ; 17 CFR § 240.15c3-1. 
A number of provisions of the 1934 Act provide the Commission with 
the authority needed to enforce the reporting requirements of § 17 (a) and 
the rules adopted thereunder. E. g., § 15 (b) (4), 15 U.S. C. § 78o (b) (4) 
(authorizes institution of administrative proceedings and imposition of 
sanctions against brokers for, inter alia, materially misleading statements 
in reports or applications required to be filed with the Commission); § 21, 
15 U. S. C. § 78u (allows Commission to investigate and enjoin violations 
and to refer violations to the Attorney General for possible prosecution) ; 
§ 32, 15 U. S. C. § 78ff (authorizes criminal sanctions for violations 
of statute and rules and for materially misleading statements in reports 
or documents required to be filed by the statute or rules) ; see n. 4, supra, 
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steps can be taken. By its terms,§ 17 (a) is forward-looking, 
not retrospective; it seeks to forestall insolvency, not to pro-
vide recompense after it has occurred. In short, there is no 
basis in the language of§ 17 (a) for inferring that a civil cause 
of action for damages lay in favor of anyone. Cart v. Ash, 
422 U. S., at 79. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, the legislative history 
of the 1934 Act is entirely silent on the question whether a 
private right of action for damages should or should not be 
available under § 17 (a) in the circumstances of this case. 
App. 198. SIPC and the Trustee nevertheless argue that be-
cause Congress did not express an intent to deny a private 
cause of action under § 17 (a), this Court should infer one. 
But implying a private right of action on the basis of con-
gressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best. See 
&mta Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 64 (1978). 
And where, as here, the plain language of the provision 
weighs against implication of a private remedy, the fact that 
there is no suggestion whatsoever in the legislative history 
that § 17 (a) may give rise to suits for damages reinforces our 
decision not to find wch a right of action implicit within the 
section. See Cart v. Ash, supra, at 82-84; cf. Securities In-
vestor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, supra; Amtrak, supra; 
T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S. 464 (1959).11 
Further justification for our decision not to imply the 
private remedy that SIPC and the Trustee seek to establish 
11 What legislative history there is of § 17 (a) simply confirms our belief 
that § 17 (a) was intended solely to be an integral part of a system of 
preventative reporting and monitoring, and not to provide remedies to 
customers for losses after liquidation. S. Rep. No. 792·, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess ., 13, 21 (1934); H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1934) ; 
Hearings before the House Inter~tate and Foreign Commerce Committee 
on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 22, 225-226 (1934) . 
See also S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 119 U975) (legislative-
history of the 1975 amendments to§ 17) . 
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may be found in the statutory scheme of which § 17 (a) is a 
part. First, § 17 (a) is flanked by provisions of the 1934 
Act that explicitly grant private causes of action. § 16 (b), 
15 U.S. C.§ 78p (b); § 18 (a), 15 U.S. C.§ 78r (a). Section 
9 (e) of the 1934 Act also expressly provides a private right 
of action. 15 U. S. C. § 78i (e). See also § 20, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78t. Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a 
private damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so 
expressly. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U. S. 723, 734 (1975); see Amtrak, 414 U. S., at 458; 
T. l. M. E., Inc. v. United States, supra, at 471. 
Second, § 18 (a) creates a private cause of action against 
persons, such as accountants, who "make or cause to be made" 
materially misleading statements in a.ny reports or other doc-
uments filed with the Commission, although the cause of ac~ 
tion is limited to persons who, in reliance on the statements, 
purchased or sold a security whose price was affected by the 
statements.12 15 U. S. C. § 78r (a); see Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 211 n. 31; Blue Chip Stamps v. 
12 Section 18 (a) provides: 
"Liability for misleading statements 
11 (a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement 
in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or 
any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a regis-
tration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, 
which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances 
under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material 
fact, shall be liable to any per~on (not knowing that such statement was 
false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have pur-
chased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statemPnt, 
for damages caused by such reliance, uniPss the person sued shall prove 
that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was 
false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at 
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit 
the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of 
the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees, against either party litigant." 
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Manor Drug Stores, supra, at 736. Since SIPC and the 
Trustee do not allege that the Weis customers purchased 
or sold securities in reliance on the § 17 (a) reports at issue, 
they cannot sue Touche Ross under § 18 (a).18 Instead, their 
claim is that the Weis customers did not get the enforcement 
action they would have received if the § 17 (a) reports had 
been accurate.14 SIPC and the ·Trustee argue that § 18 (a) 
cannot provide the exclusive remedy for misstatements made 
in § 17 (a) reports because the cause of action created by 
§ 18 (a) is expressly limited to purchasers and sellers. They 
assert that Congress could not have intended in § 18 (a) to 
deprive customers, such as those whom they seek to represent, 
of a cause of action for misstatements contained in § 17 (a) 
reports. 
There is evidence to support the view that § 18 (a) was 
13 In another action arising out of the Weis financial collapse, the Dis-
trict Court has sustained a § 18 (a) claim against Touche Ross by a bank 
that allegedly purchased securities of Weis in reliance upon the § 17 (a) 
reports involved in this case. Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & 
Co., 75 Civ. 916 (SDNY); see Redington v. To·uche Ross & Co., App. 215 
n. 5 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). And in a case related to the instant case, 
the customers of Weis brought a class action aga.in&i Touche Ro~s under 
§ 18 (a), claiming, inter alia, that Touche Ross violated Commission Rule 
17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5. The District Court in that case dismissed 
the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs did not meet the purchaser-
seller requirement of § 18 (a) and thus could not maintain an action under 
that section. Rich v. To·uche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 102-104 
(SDNY 1976). We express no view as to the correctness of either of these 
rulings. 
14 For example, the complaint alleges : 
· "Weis' 1973 forced liquidation under [SIPAl would not have become neces-
sary, and most if not all of Weis' assets and its good will as a going con-
cern could have been preserved by a number of means, including [infusion 
of capital or merger with another firm] . . . . Moreover, if a liquidation of 
Weis had become necessary as the result of . .. truthful reporting, such 
liquidation could have occurred at the end of Weis' 1972 fiscal year, when 
its assets were greater and the aggregate of its liabilities was lower than .a 
year later." App. 8--9. 
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intended to provide the exclusive remedy for misstatements 
contained in any reports filed with the Commission, including 
those filed pursuant to § 17 (a).15 Certainly, SIPC and the 
Trustee have pointed to no evidence of a legislative intent to 
except § 17 (a) reports from § 18 (a)'s purview. Cf. Securi-
ties Investor Protection Corp., 421 U. S., at 419-420; Amtrak, 
414 U. S., at 458. But we need not decide whether Congress 
expressly intended § 18 (a) to provide the exclusive remedy 
for misstatements contained in § 17 (a) reports. For where 
the principal express civil remedy for misstatements in reports 
created by Congress contemporaneously with the passage of 
§ 17 (a) is by its terms limited to purchasers and sellers of 
securities, we are extremely reluctant to imply a cause of 
action in § 17 (a) that is significantly broader than the rem-
edy that Congress chose to provide. Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, supra, at 735-736; see Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, supra, at 210; Securities Investor Protection Cor-
poration v. Barbour, supra, at 421-423; Amtrak, supra, at 
458; cf. T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S., at 471.10 
15 For example, Senator Fletcher in introducing the bill that formed the 
basis for the 1934 Act, stated that "Section [18] imposes civil liability for 
false or misleading statements in any of the reports or records required 
under this act." 78 Cong. Rec. 2271 (1934) (emphasis added). Richard 
Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange, testified at length 
regarding the 1934 Act proposals. In testimony before the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking & Currency, he indicated his understanding that§ 18 (a) 
liability extended to "person~ transacting business in securities." Hea.rings 
on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 before the Senate Committee 
on Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6638 (1934). 
16 Touche Ross insists that the existence of SIPA also is relevant to the 
question whether to imply a private right of action in § 17 (a). Con-
gress specifically enacted SIP A in 1970 to afford customers of broker-
dealers, such as Weis' customers, protection against losses they might 
incur as a result of the financial failure of their broker-dealer. SIPA 
established a comprehensive plan of insurance for customers of brokerage 
firms. See n. 5, supra. And recently Congre~s has increased the amounts 
by which customer accounts are insured to $40,000 for cash claims and 
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SIPC and the Trustee urge, and the Court of Appeals 
agreed, that the analysis should not stop here. Relying on 
the factors set forth in Cart v. Ash, 422 U. S., at 78, they 
assert that we also must consider whether an implied private 
remedy is necessary to "effectuate the purpose of the section" 
and whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated 
to state law. SIPC and the Trustee contend that implication 
of a private remedy is essential to the goals of § 17 (a) and 
that enforcement of § 17 (a) is properly a matter of federal, 
not state, concern. Brief for Trustee 30-35; Brief for SIPC 
42-52. We need not reach the merits of the arguments con-
cerning the "necessity" of implying a private remedy and the 
proper forum for enforcement of the rights asserted by SIPC 
and the Trustee, for we believe such inquiries have little 
relevance to the decision of this case. It is true that in 
Cart v. Ash, supra, the Court set forth four factors that it 
considered "relevant" in determining whether a private remedy 
is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the 
Court did not decide that each of these factors is entitled 
to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Con ... 
$100,000 for cash and securities claims. Securities Investor Protection 
Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-'283, § 9, 92 Stat. 265. Touche 
Ross asserts that there is no indication in the legislative history of SIP A 
or its amendments that Congress thought the 1934 Act contained a remedy 
for customers of insolvent brokerage firms. Brief for Touche Ross 62 n. 
37; Reply Brief for Touche Ross 11-12. It claims that Congress believed 
it was "filling a 'regulatory void'" when it passed SIPA. /d., at 12; see 
S. Rep. No. 91-1218, 91st Cong., '2d Seb'5., 3 (1970). Given the fact that 
our task is to discern the intent of Congress when it enacted § 17 (a) in 
1934, we doubt tl1e relevance of SIPA to our inquiry. And even if the 
91st Congress had believed that there was an implied right of action under 
§ 17 (a), SIPA still would have been needed to protect customers in situa. 
tions where there was no fraud or whf're the fraud was committed only by 
the broker, who, because of its in~olvency, would probably be judgment-
proof. Accordingly, our decision not to infer a right of action in favor of 
brokerage cuo;tomere from § 1i (a) is not influenced by the existence of 
SIPA. 
78-309-0PINION 
TOUCHE ROSS & CO. v. REDINGTON 15 
gress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, 
a private cause of action. Here, the statute by its terms 
grants no private rights to any identifiable class and proscribes 
no conduct as unlawful. And the parties as well as the Court 
of Appeals agree that the legislative history of the 1934 Act 
simply does not speak to the issue of private remedies under 
§ 17 (a). At least in such a case as this, the inquiry ends 
there: The question whether Congres, either expressly or by 
implication, intended to create a private right of action, has 
been definitively answered in the negative. 
Finally, SIP A and the Trustee argue that our decision in 
J. I. Case v. Borak, supra, requires implication of a private 
cause of action under§ 17 (a). In Borak, the Court found in 
§ 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78n (a), an implied 
cause of action for damages in favor of shareholders for losses 
resulting from deceptive proxy solicitations in violation of 
§ 14 (a). SIPC and the Trustee emphasize language in 
Borak that discusses the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act 
and § 27 of the Act, which, inter alia, grants to federal district 
courts the exclusive jurisdiction of violations of the Act and 
suits to enforce any liability or duty created by the Act or 
the rules and regulations thereunder.17 They argue that 
17 Section 27 provides as follows : 
"The district courts of the United Sta.tes, and the United StatE'S courts 
of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the 
rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at 
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or 
the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be 
brought in the district whrrein any act or transaction constituting the 
violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this chapter or rules and rrgulntions thereundrr, or to enjoin 
any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in 
any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an 
inhabitant or transacts busincs~, and process in such cases may be served 
in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever 
the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shalf 
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Touche Ross has breached its duties under § 17 (a) and the 
rules adopted thereunder and that in view of § 27 and of the 
remedial purposes of the 1934 Act. federal courts should pro-
vide a damage remedy for the breach.18 
The reliance of SIPC and the Trustee on § 27 is misplaced. 
Section 27 grants jurisdiction to the federal courts and pro-
vides for venue and service of process. It creates no cause 
of action of its own force and effect; it imposes no liabilities. 
The source of plaintiffs' rights must be found, if at all, in the 
substantive provisions of the 1934 Act which they seek to 
enforce, not in the jurisdictional provision. See Securities In-
vestors Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S., at 424. · The 
Court in Borak found a private cause of action implicit in 
§ 14 (a). See Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 
---- n. 13; Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U. S., 
at 25; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S., at 557. We 
do not now question the actual holding of that case, but we 
decline to read the opinion so broadly that virtually every 
provision of the securities acts gives rise to an implied private 
cause of action. E. g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc;., 
supra.10 
be subject to review as provided in sections 225 and 347 of Title 28. No 
costs shall be assessed for or against the Commission in any proceeding 
under this chapter brought by or against it in tl1e Supreme Court or such 
other courts." 15 U. S. C. § 78aa. 
18 SIPC and the Trustee also avpear to suggest that the rules adopted 
under § 17 (a) can themselves provide tlH' source of an implied damage 
remedy even if § 17 (a) itself cannot. See Brief for SIPC 27-31; Brief for 
Trustre 25-35; n. 3, supra. It suffices to ;.;ay, bowever, that the lan-
guage of the stMute and not the rules must control. Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 214; Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U. S., at 472, 
10 We also have found implicit within § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act a private 
cause of action for damages. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & 
Cas. Co., 404 U. S., at 13 n. 9. Bui we recently have stated that in 
Supe1intendent this Court simply explicitly acquiesced in the 25-year-
old acceptance by the lower federal courts of an implied action under 
§ 10 (b). Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at ---, n. 13; 
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The invocation of the "remedial purposes" of the 1934 Act 
is similarly unavailing. Only last Term, we emphasized that 
·generalized references to the "remedial purposes" of the 1934 
Act will not justify reading a provision "more broadly than 
its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.'' 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 
116 (1978); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 
200. Certainly, the mere fact that § 17 (a) was designed to 
·provide protection for brokers' customers does not require the 
implication of 11 private damage action in their behalf. Can-
non v. University of Chicago, supra, at-; Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, supra, at 421. To the 
extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that of the 
Court in Borak, it suffices to say that in t~- series of cases since 
Borak we have adhered to a stricter standard for the implica-
tion of private causes of action, and we follow that stricter 
standard today. Cannon v. University of Chicago, - U. S. 
at -. The ultimate question is one of congressional in-
tent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve 
upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law. 
see Ernst & Ernest v. Hochfelder, supra, at 196; Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, Inc., 421 U. S., at 730. There is no similar history of 
longstanding lower court interpretation in this case. Indeed, only one 
other court in the 45-year history of the 1934 Act has held that a private 
cause of action for damages is available under § 17 (a). Hawkins v. 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenne1· & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 124 (WD Ark. 
1949). In Hawkins, a national brokerage firm was held liable for dam-
ages under § 17 (a) to a defalcating correspondent's customers for im-
properly advising the correspondent, who was found to be controlled by 
the national firm, to describe its business in such a way as to avoid filing 
certified financial statements with the Commission under§ 17 (a). Citing 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa. 1946), the 
District Court simply stated that violation of any of the provisions of the 
1934 Act would give ri~e to a civil suit for damages on the part. of the one 
injured, and that the defendants did not contend to the contrary. 69 F. 
Supp., at 121. 
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SIPC and the Trustee contend that the result we reach 
sanctions injustice. But even if that were the case, the 
argument is made in the wrong forum, for we are not at 
liberty to legislate. If there is to be a federal damage remedy 
under these circumstances, Congress must provide it. "[I]t 
is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area." 
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 652 (1963). Obviously, 
nothing we have said prevents CongTess from creating a private 
right of action on behalf of brokerage firm customers for losses 
arising from misstatements contained in § 17 (a) reports. 
But if Congress intends those customers to have such a fed-
eral right of action, it is well aware of how it may effectuate 
that intent. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opirlion. 
It is so ordered. 
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